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A
VINDICATION

OF THE

ACCOUNT

OF THE

DOUBLE DOCTRINE of the
ANCIENTS.

IN ANSWER TO A

CRITICAL ENQUIRY ^{TK}

INTO THE

PRACTICES of the ANTIENT
PHILOSOPHERS.

L O N D O N :

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VINDICATION

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DOUBLE DOCTRINE, &c.

AS Mr. *Warburton* has declared, that He would “ become responsible for ALL ” that the Author of the *Critical Enquiry into the Opinions and Practices of the Antient Philosophers* “ says ; and likewise that He was “ willing that those of his Opinions there debated, may stand or fall by the strength or Invalidity of his Defence ; ”—I have taken the Liberty to examine what that Writer has said upon the Subject of the *Double Doctrine* of the Antients, and to enquire whether “ *their favourite*

"*Doctrine*" (as 'tis called) "was so *flagitious*
 "and *destructive of all Morality*, that they did not
 "dare to impart it to the people." p. 98.

It was laid down by Mr. Warburton, as a certain Truth, "That the Antient Sages did actually say one thing when they thought another." D. L. p. 336. And this he undertakes to prove in these Words. "This appears from that general practice in the *Greek Philosophy* of a
 "TWO-FOLD DOCTRINE, the EXTERNAL and the INTERNAL, a *Vulgar* and
 "a Secret one. The first *openly* taught to all,
 "and the Second *confined to a Select Number*." By this then we are prepared to think that the EXTERNAL or VULGAR Doctrine was, What these Antient Sages said and did not believe; at the same time that the INTERNAL or SECRET Doctrine was what they said and really thought. But this being a Point to be proved, and not merely asserted, an Objection rose, founded upon his own words immediately following, in which he has given such an Account of the *Double Doctrine*, as made it, as was conceived, impossible for him ever to shew, That in That, the Antients ever said one thing, and meant another. "Nor were They," [the EXTERNAL and INTERNAL, the *Vulgar* and Secret]
 "different Doctrines, but one and the same that
 "was handled thus differently, viz. POPULARLY and SCIENTIFICALLY." The Internal and Secret Doctrine then, was not "a different Doctrine" from the *Vulgar* and *External*; It was "one and the same, that was handled differently." How handled differently? Was it by "actually saying one thing when they thought another?" This was the Point that should have been proved; and he should have proceeded in

in this manner, — They were *one and the same handled differently*, viz. by *saying* in the one case what they really *meant*; and in the other, *talking* to the people according to their Notions, but not Themselves believing what They said. But Instead of this Mr. Warburton tells us that the different handling of the Two-fold Doctrine consisted in quite another thing, viz. in handling it POPULARLY and SCIENTIFICALLY; or as it was in his first Edition, PHILOSOPHICALLY. The POPULAR manner of handling of a Subject is, so to handle it that the common People may easily understand what is said; and thus it is rightly opposed to SCIENTIFIC: The *Philosophical* or SCIENTIFIC manner is, to make use of nothing but abstract close reasoning; to argue in such a strict manner of deducing Consequences from Principles, That Those only who understand the more subtle and recondite Philosophy can comprehend what is said. And this must be owned to be a true Account of the EXTERNAL and INTERNAL Doctrine, and may be justified by good Authority. But if Mr. Warburton means by popular handling a doctrine, the *Saying* what a man does *not think* or *mean*; and by scientifically treating it, or philosophically, The *speaking* a man's *inward Sentiments* in opposition to an *external Profession* of what he does *not believe*, — This is at least a *New Language*. For a Philosopher may treat a Subject in a *Vulgar* or *Popular* manner, and really *believe* what He *says*, as much as when he treats any Subject in a *Scientific* manner, which is granted to imply *Belief*. The *manner of treating* any Subject, be it either *Popular* or *Scientific*, has no relation to *Belief* in the Person that uses the One or the Other Manner; since a Subject may be treated either way,
and

and be believed or not believed: and consequently the using a *Two-fold Doctrine*, which consisted only in these two Manners of handling the *Same Doctrine* will not, cannot prove, that these Sages *actually said what they did not mean*.

It was upon this stating the case by Mr. Warburton, and his acknowledging that the *Two-fold Doctrine* was “not a *different Doctrine*, but one “and the *same* that was handled thus differently, viz. *popularly and scientifically*,” or *Philosophically*, that the Question was put. — “What Proof can NOW be produced that in the “*Two-fold Doctrine*, those antient Sages *actually said one thing and believed another*? what instance is or can be produced of this Fact?” When this Question was asked, Was it not that an instance should be produced in the *Two-fold Doctrine*? For that alone is the Subject in debate. And must it not be an Instance of a Doctrine, which by Supposition is handled only in a *different Manner*, either *popularly* or *scientifically*? The Terms EXTERNAL and INTERNAL, VULGAR and SECRET, signify the *same Doctrine*, only taught as POPULAR or SCIENTIFIC. The *external, vulgar*, Doctrine is the *same Doctrine* as one handled *popularly*: The *Secret, internal*, Doctrine is *one and the same Doctrine* as the *Popular*, only it is *handled scientifically*. Say now, how is it possible to prove, that when the antient Sages used the *Twofold Doctrine*, That they *actually said what they did not think*, when they only handled the *same Doctrine* in a *different Manner*? Is it possible to prove, that in *every Subject* that a man treats in a *Popular Manner*, he must mean different from what he *says*? For it must be true, in *Every Subject* that is treated *popularly*, that a Man does not believe what he *says*,
or

or else you cannot conclude from the mere *popular Manner* to actual disbelief of what the man professes.

But the Author of the *Critical Enquiry*, omitting the *Ground* upon which the Objection was made, and imagining that nothing else was designed by the Question—*What Proof now can be produced, that in the Two-fold Doctrine the Philosophers actually said one thing, and believed another?*—Omitting, I say, the ground of the Objection, and imagining that he was only to produce an instance of the Philosophers *saying what they did not believe*, — “HERE says he, we join Issue; if “such an Instance CAN be produced, the Doctor I am persuaded will allow the mistake to “lie on his side.—If it cannot, I readily give up “the Doctrine of the *Divine Legation* as chimerical and groundless.” p. 85.

If he *joins Issue* with his Adversary Here, He is to produce an instance, 1st, In the *Two-fold Doctrine*. 2. In *one and the same* Doctrine handled only *popularly* or *scientifically*. 3. Where the *Popular* manner of handling a Subject is the *only* ground for conceiving a man to *say what he did not believe*. For a man may handle, I conceive, any Subject *popularly*, and yet believe it? or he may handle it *scientifically*, and not believe it.

And now what are the Reflections which naturally arise upon seeing a man pretending to *join issue* in a certain Point, and yet altering entirely the Question? He was to produce an instance in the *Two-fold Doctrine* which had been declared to be “*one and the same Doctrine handled in a different Manner*,” which *Manner*, be it either *popular* or *scientific*, does not carry the Idea of *Belief* or *Disbelief*: And truly he produces Instances of Mens telling *notorious Lies*; which if allowed
to

to be to the purpose, he must say, that if they were handled *scientifically*, they must have been *believed* by the Inventors; but if *popularly*, then the Inventors did *not believe them*. I would not willingly charge this Author, with having a *mind open to Conviction*: That is a Virtue which Mr. Warburton has made the Subject of Ridicule; and this Gentleman has *twice* in this chapter treated it in much the same manner. To be "a zealous Advocate for *Sincerity*, and yet to act in "a *disingenuous* manner," is justly treated by him as it deserves: But then he should remember his own Reflection upon such a Conduct, which is, that "common Answerers like common Women, "do every day those things which good manners will not suffer us to call by the right "Name." p. 91. I beg therefore of Mr. Warburton, for his own sake, for the sake of Truth, for the sake of common Justice, not to make himself *responsible* for such gross Misrepresentation of the Point in debate; Nor will I offend against good manners by giving this Behaviour the name it deserves.

Let now Mr. Warburton's Position be remembered, *viz.* That the Two-fold Doctrine is not "a different Doctrine, but *one and the same* that "was handled *thus differently*, *viz.* *Popularly* and "Scientifically." And now let the Instances be produced, to prove that *in the Two-fold Doctrine* the Antient Sages *did actually say one thing*, when they *thought another*.

This Author's *First* Instance is taken from the *Legislators* of old. "As to their *Laws*, they are "so far from representing them as the mere Suggestions of human Policy and Wisdom, that they "every where assert their Divine Origin; *they* "impute them to the Invention of the Gods. Here "then

“ then let the learned Doctor tell us, did they
 “ themselves believe this to be the real fact ? Did
 “ they suppose that their Laws were dictated and
 “ framed by some Deity ? Or was this after all,
 “ a pure *Fiction* and *Contrivance* of their own ?
 “ He must say, that it was a *fable* of their Inven-
 “ tion. And therefore it is certain, by his own
 “ Confession, that the Antients in this case *did say*
 “ *one thing when they believed another.*” p. 85.

The answer to this is,

1. This is not an Instance in the *Two-fold Doc-
 trine*. It should have been an Instance in *one and
 the same Doctrine* taught *popularly* sometimes, at
 other times *scientifically* : and in course *not believed*
 when taught *popularly*, but *believed* when taught in
 the *other* manner.

2. This is an instance of men asserting or teach-
 ing a direct downright LIE. Now I do not
 know, nor ever heard of any one that ever main-
 tained that the Antients never told a LIE, or
 never spoke what they knew to be false.

3. Supposing that the Antients held it allow-
 able to LIE for the good of the Commonweal, if
 they had treated this Falshood in a *scientific* man-
 ner, would that have proved that they *believed*
 what they knew to be false, more than their treat-
 ing a falshood in a *popular* manner would prove
 that they did *not believe* it ?

4. Were this instance as full a proof as can be
 desired, that the antient Legislators did *lie* on some
 Occasions, yet it is no refutation of the Objection
 made against Mr. Warburton's Assertion. He had
 said, that the *Two-fold Doctrine* consisted in a dif-
 ferent way of handling the same Subject ; and
 that the *different manner* of treating the same Doc-
 trine was either *popular* or *philosophical*. Hence it
 was observed, that it was impossible from this ac-

count of the *Double Doctrine*, to infer either believing or not believing what was said. What now is done by this Author? Why He produces an Instance of the *Legislators* telling the People a Notorious LIE, *i. e.* says he, *saying one thing and believing another*. But does he infer that the Legislators said one thing and believed another from the *Popular manner* in which they delivered themselves; or does he infer it from the *Scientific manner* they at any time used? For the Subject confines him to the *manner* in which the *Two-fold Doctrine* was handled: And as to the *Popular* or *Scientific Manner*, He has not attempted to make good his Argument from *Them*, but only tells us a Fact that they told the people a Lie: which has no more relation to the *Two-fold Doctrine*, than it has to the most distant thing on Earth.

But our Author may perhaps succeed better in relation to the *Philosophers* than he has with the *Legislators*; and therefore it is fit to examine their Evidence. And here he sets out unluckily with asserting; that “the Learned Gentleman affirms “that They never teach one thing, and think another.” It would have been but Justice to have produced the Passage on which he grounds this charge; and not to have dropped those very material words, IN THE TWO-FOLD DOCTRINE, explained by Mr. Warburton, to be popular and scientific. But not to stop him; He goes on — “Pray what then was Pythagoras doing, when he gave out that he had descended into the infernal Regions: that he had visited the Seats and Abodes of departed Souls: that he had seen with his own eyes the Tortures and Punishments inflicted on the Wicked?”

p. 86.

Here

Here is a *Second* Instance labouring under all the defects of the first. "What was *Pythagoras* doing when he gave out that he had "descended into the infernal Regions?" Why, he was telling a LIE in the gross *immoral* sense of that word: He was guilty of an *Imposture*; not of using the *Two-fold Doctrine*, I mean the *Esoteric* and *Exoteric* Doctrine of the Antients. Does any one of them make the *Two-fold Doctrine* consist in telling such LIES as this? It would be easy for men of so much Reading as Mr. *Warburton* and this Author, to produce some Instances, where the words *Esoteric* and *Exoteric* are applied, (if ever they are applied,) to cases of such notorious Falshood. But I own that in my little compass of Search, I have met with none.

2. The *Popular* Doctrine was suited to Popular Prejudices or Opinions: The *Esoteric* Doctrine was what the Disciples of the Philosophers were let into. Now, How does it appear that *Pythagoras* ever let his Disciples into the Truth, that He only *pretended* to have gone into the *Infernal Regions*? Did his famous *ipse dixit*, prevail here? Or is his descent into the Infernal Regions, and his no Descent, *One and the same Doctrine*?

Mr. *Warburton* has told us, and I argue from his Concession, that the Double Doctrine was *one and the same* [Doctrine] only handled in a different manner, popularly and scientifically. The *Popular* Doctrine then was, that *Pythagoras* in the Internal Regions saw *Hesiod* and *Homer* most grievously tormented. The *Scientific* Doctrine was, that there are *no Infernal Regions*. Now I cannot but ask, How are these Two-fold Doctrines ONE AND THE SAME Doctrine handled in a different manner? Is it the *different manner* only of handling the *same* Doctrine,

Doctrines, that makes the Two-fold Doctrine ; and yet in the present case we are taught, That there *are* Punishments after Death, and there *are no* Punishments after Death ? I very well understand how *one and the same Doctrine* may be handled *popularly* and *scientifically* : *Popularly*, By using Topics suited to the Peoples Capacities ; By arguing and dilating upon a Subject ; By using proper Figures ; By running Comparisons ; By spreading the Matter, and setting it in different Lights ; and thus explaining a Subject : *Scientifically*, By abstract close reasoning ; By deducing Consequences directly from Principles ; By arguing from the more subtle and recondite nature of things. And thus, I think, the *Two-fold Doctrine* was understood by the Antients. But to keep to the present case. It was a *Popular Doctrine*, used by *Pythagoras*, that there were Punishments in the Infernal Regions ; that He himself had been an Eye-witness to *Hesiod's* Soul being tied to a Brass Pillar, and lamenting in a grievous manner ; That he had seen *Homer's* Soul hanging on a Tree, and Snakes all about it. This was it seems the *Popular Doctrine*. Take now the *same Doctrine*, *one and the same*, and treat it *scientifically*, (For this Mr. *Warburton* has told us was the case of the *Two-fold Doctrine*,) you cannot here say, There will be *no Punishments* hereafter ; or That the Soul will be *absorpt*, or *annihilated*.— For this is not the *same Doctrine*, *handled in a different manner*, but quite a *different Doctrine*, treat it in what manner you please. So that this instance of *Pythagoras* is no more to the purpose of explaining the nature of the *Two-fold Doctrine*, than was That of the *Legislators* : and this Author is still to produce an Instance, in the TWO-FOLD DOCTRINE, as explained by

by Mr. Warburton, that the Philosophers *actually* said one thing and believed another.

This Gentleman proceeds to a *Third Instance*, taken from "the *same Sect*. The common Doctrine taught that the Souls of men were doomed to pass into other Bodies as a Punishment for their Sins in this life. The Philosophers themselves sometimes inculcated this notion; but then they sometimes give a very different account of the doctrine; Souls are to migrate into other Bodies by a mere *physical* and *natural* Necessity, and not by way of Punishment. Here then are Two contrary Notions of a FUTURE STATE; the one supposes a moral purpose and design; the other gives all to pure necessity."

But this Gentleman overlooks the Notion of the *Two-fold Doctrine* as Mr. Warburton had given it, and which was the foundation of all that was said on this head. The *Two-fold Doctrine* was "one and the same, differently handled." Now a Transmigration for Punishment is a different Doctrine from a Transmigration by pure necessity; and therefore not to the purpose. Or if you say that the Transmigration by necessity was not a Transmigration but a Refusion of the Soul,—This will be so far from being the *same* Doctrine, that it will be quite another. I must ask here, which was the *Popular*, and which was the *Scientifical* manner of handling the Doctrine of Transmigration? The Answer I suppose will be, The Transmigration for Punishment, held on the score of Utility was the *Popular*. What then was the *Scientifical* manner of handling the *same* Doctrine? The Answer must be, That there was *no* Transmigration at all. Hence then one must conclude, That *no* Transmigration, and a Transmigration for Punishment, were one and the same Doctrine, handled differently.

But

But it is not contrary Notions about *Transmigration*, but “contrary Notions of a *future State*,” that were taught. Let us therefore consider this. The *popular* Notion of a future State taught by *Pythagoras* was, That *Transmigration* was for *Punishment*; that a Coward’s Soul was to pass into a Woman’s body, &c. This it seems *Pythagoras* did *not believe*. But how will this be proved? We have from *Ovid* “Words given “to *Pythagoras* himself”, and “it is certain (this Author tells us so) “that *they contain his Notion*.” p. 72. Upon this then I argue, that *Pythagoras* only substituted one sort of a Future state instead of another. He rejected, *Styx*, and all the other figments of the Poets: and in Opposition to them, he assures the *Crotoniates*,

Morte carent Animæ, semperq; priore relicta
Sede, novis domibus vivunt habitantq; receptæ.

That Souls never die, but having left their former Tenement, They LIVE in new Houses. It is true that this is “opposed to the common doctrine of another Life”; but it asserts the Soul’s *Living* after it is gone out of this Body: And if it lives, and animates other Bodies, as here *Pythagoras* himself says, (and this Author assures us, that *Ovid*’s Words “contain his Notion”,) how is it possible to prove that he did *not believe* what he here says? His account of his *own* Transmigration; his Assurance that *the Soul was always the same, but only migrated into other forms*, plainly enough shew the reason of his rejecting the *common* Opinion of a future State, and what sort of a future State he pleaded for in its Stead.

But, This Gentleman imagines, that the “Transmigration here described was *Physical* and “*necessary*”, and that “this was a *Secret and* “*bidden*

" *bidden Doctrine.*" By this then he means that this *Secret* and *bidden* Doctrine was the real-Sentiment of *Pythagoras*, and the Other was the *vulgar*, *popular* Scheme. He should remember that this physical Transmigration was still a continued *LIFE*: let there be an *Absorption* or *Refusion* of the Soul into God, yet it was by no means a *Destruction* of *Life*: and let it be observed that *Ovid* has said nothing of the *Time* when this *Refusion* of the Soul was to be, nor of this Notion of *Pythagoras* as *secret* or *bidden*. He has said indeed that He would tell,

Magna, nec ingeniis *evestigata* priorum
Quæq; diu latuere.

Great matters, which had never been found out or known by any before him: And accordingly he proceeds to tell these *great matters*, and not to keep them a *Secret*. But there is not a word about *not Belief* of what he said; or of a *Secret* Doctrine not to be *divulged*; but the contrary, an *open*, and undisguised account of his real Sentiments, in opposition to the *Vulgar* Notion of *Styx*.

But we are told, " Here are two contrary Notions of a future State, the one supposes a moral purpose and design, the other gives all to pure necessity.— *Must not* the Philosophers therefore, when they preach up the Popular Notion, *say one thing and believe another.*"

The Answer is plain, No. They need not. The Philosophers might not see or feel this repugnancy, supposing that in strict reasoning there is a Real Opposition of Principles. And in the case before us, *Pythagoras* taught a Transmigration of Souls, and yet might " give all to pure *Necessity.*" For First what he meant by *Necessity* is to be examined; for he may not mean by that Term, a necessary efficient cause, but may use

use it consistent with Moral designation. Thus when *Timæus* says, *Music and Philosophy, being appointed by the Gods for the correction and amendment of the Soul, accustom and persuade, nay and necessitate, ποταναρχάζει the irrational part to obey the rational.* This is perfectly consistent with moral Design and Purpose; and what in all Languages is usual: Not for *Force* or *absolute necessity*, but for what commonly and generally avails for a certain use or purpose. And 2. Is it certain that *Pythagoras*, who held a supream Governor of the Universe, intended any more than to give us a philosophical account of what he thought the *course of Nature*? He tells us of a constant *change* of things, and of Souls migration into Beasts, and Birds, and other Forms; but this might be consistent in his *Notion*, with the Soul's Return at last into God, after it has undergone these various changes. Suppose now that he meant by the constant change and succession of things of the world no more than an *established order of Providence* which appointed things to go on in this manner, — Then these two opinions of a future state may not be *repugnant*, but *consistent*; and his opinion of Transmigration may be *believed* as much as what is called his *Secret Opinion*. Souls changed their Habitation, but did not *die*. What then became of them, for they always *live*? *Pythagoras* might answer, “ They *Transmigrated*, and at last returned into God;” [whatever those strange words mean] “ For certainly they do not die, for *Souls always Live*,” which could not be, if the Refusion into God implied a State of Insensibility. This instance therefore does not prove, that this Philosopher *said one thing and believed another*, in virtue of any *Two-fold Doctrine* he held.

Let

Let us pass to the next instance taken from the *Stoics*, "The Refusion of the Soul." Which says this Author, "we have shewn that they supposed it "to be a mere Insensibility." "It was resolved "in the divine Nature: and this I conceive to be "destructive of all future Rewards and Punishments." p. 54. *

I do not not think myself concerned to explain what any of the *Stoics* meant by, *being remixed in the divine nature, or returning into the Whole*; (which is all strange unintelligible Language;) and whether it does or does not imply a total Insensibility, I shall not enquire. Only this I would observe, that *Pythagoras* conceived the Soul to LIVE, notwithstanding his Notion of the Refusion of it into God. But this Gentleman should not so hastily have said, "That it was allowed "on all hands that this was the Secret Doctrine "with regard to a future State." Do not the *Stoics* openly in their Books own this Doctrine? Does not *Seneca*, does not *Antoninus* publicly teach it? Consistent with one another or inconsistent; intelligibly or unintelligibly, or what they pretended to mean, is not the Point in this place: But what was the *Secret*, and what was the *Public*, openly avowed, notion; since Both were published in their Books, and their Books were common to all.

My Second Remark is, that the *Stoics* are known to have held contradictions: But it does not therefore follow, that they said one thing and believed another, more than a *Papist* says one thing and believes another, because he maintains *Transubstantiation*; or that any man says a thing that he does not believe, when he happens to hold repugnant Doctrines. You must first prove, that at least he sees the Repugnancy he is charged with,

C

before

Let

before you can infer that he *openly* holds one Doctrine and *privately* believes another. Now how does it appear, that the *Refusion* of the Soul was “ the *Secret Doctrine* with regard to a Future “ State,” when this Notion is *published openly* in their Books, and made *no Secret* of? Or which way shall we distinguish a *Secret Doctrine* from an *Open* one, if Both are equally *published* in their Books?

The Absurdities of *Chrysippus* and *Cleanthes* concerning the Gods are not gathered, says *Plutarch*, from their Suppositions, or drawn by consequence from their doctrine; But they themselves proclaim it aloud in their Writings, and expressly say in their Books, concerning the Gods, Providence, Fate, and Nature. διαρρήδην λέγουσι, say openly, [not making it a *Secret doctrine*] that all their Gods were generated, and will be destroyed by Fire, melted as if they had been made of Tin or Wax. This Passage of *Plutarch* our Author quotes p. 56*. And yet when he comes to treat of the *Two-fold Doctrine*, what *Plutarch* tells us, μέγα βοᾶντες, roaring out aloud, διαρρήδην λέγουσι, they speak openly, He says was a *Secret Doctrine*, kept to the Philosophers themselves. I shall only ask, if it were openly averred in their Writings, how is it a *Secret Doctrine*? and whether *Plutarch* could possibly have called an *Esoteric Doctrine*, a Doctrine that they did μέγα βοᾶν, and διαρρήδην λέγειν, openly profess, and make a great noise about in their writings?

The *Stoics* held repugnant Doctrines, and they have been openly charged with holding Contradictions. *Plutarch* has actually mentioned how one of them contradicted another, and likewise how one and the same man contradicted himself. This then being a well known Fact; when this Gentleman says, “ Must not the *private* have been “ directly opposite and repugnant to the *public* “ Teaching?

“ Teaching? The one mentions a future State
 “ with Rewards and Punishments, the other a
 “ Future State without them?”—When I say this
 Gentleman argues in this manner, He should have
 first determined the Question, Whether these re-
 pugnant doctrines are maintained by the *same*
 Persons, or by *different* ones. For, if they are
 maintained by *different* persons, then it does not
 follow from any repugnancy of Doctrines, that
 either of the Persons so much as maintained a
Two-fold Doctrine at all; And less sti'l, that ei-
 ther of them *spoke what they did not think*: For
each of them might speak, what *each* strictly be-
 lieved, though in direct contradiction to one ano-
 ther. But let us suppose the Repugnancy to be
 held by the *same* Person; the Point then will
 be to prove that this was owing to a *Two-fold*
Doctrine; to a designed contradiction of *Tongue*
and Heart. For it might be owing to several
 other causes, such as want of Accuracy, Rant,
 Carelessness, Change of Sentiment, ill Expres-
 sion, or whatever it is, that sometimes makes even
 good Writers write inconsistently.

It is observed of this Sect in particular, that
 they were so desirous of seeming to say something
 contrary to the common Notions of Mankind,
 that they would depart even from the received
 Opinions of their Sect, rather than not maintain
 a Novelty. They scarce ever talked like other
 people, but chose to maintain some Paradoxical
 Whimsy, playing upon Words, or using them in
 such a Sense as others did not. No wonder
 therefore they are charged with Paradoxes, and
 holding infinite Absurdities, and making all
 Language ambiguous and unintelligible. They
 give such different accounts of the Soul, and use
 such terms about it, that it is very hard to say

what they meant. What Idea had *Seneca* to those words, that the Soul *shall be remixed with its own nature, and shall return into the whole?* *Naturæ suæ remiscebitur, & revertetur in totum.* *Ep. 72.* As if it were not *in the whole* already: or as if any one could tell the meaning of a Soul's *remixing with its own nature.*

But all of them, it will be said, maintained a *Refusion* of the Soul, and "This was the *secret Doctrine* allowed on all hands with regard "to a future State." p. 87. Was it then a *Secret Doctrine*, and yet openly avowed in all their Books? and ~~disproven~~ publickly declared by them all? Could a Doctrine be more properly *Vulgar*, than to have it *divulged* in all their Books? Strange *Secret*! that every body knew, and that every body was let into, and every Bookseller's Shop contained a full account of! And yet (taking for granted what required the strictest proof) this Gentleman concludes from the *Stoics* holding "contrary propositions," that it was not "possible for the Philosophers not to *say one thing* "and *think another.*"

He goes on to another instance. "We have "shewn in the foregoing Sheets that the Antients "sometimes make the *Soul God*: But it is likewise obvious that they sometimes urge and insist "that the Soul is *not God*. Here then are two "different Doctrines on the very same Subject, "and is it not evident they must proceed on *contrary Propositions*?" For a Proof of this, He appeals to *Cicero*, who in one place plainly asserts, in another as plainly denies, the "*Divinity* of "the Human Soul. Had I not therefore Reason "to say, that the two Doctrines must necessarily "go upon contrary Propositions? Or in other "words, that *Cicero* in this case *MUST have* "said

"said one thing and thought another," p. 88.

To this I answer,

1. He says, "the Antients sometimes make
"the Soul, God." For this no other instance is
produced but a passage of *Cicero*, wherein he says,
*that which perceives, which remembers, which fore-
sees, which governs and rules, and moves the Body
over which it is set, is, Deus, a Divine Being,
just as he is so who governs this World.* Does
he not tell us what he means by the word, and
why he applies it in this manner? Does he mean
by it the same Being that did set it over the Bo-
dy? Or when *Virgil* called *Augustus, Deus*, Did
he mean that *Augustus* was not a *Man*, but a Be-
ing superior to *Man*? Or can any one not wil-
fully blind, mistake the meaning of such Meta-
phorical Expressions? But,

2. Let us allow that here are "Two Doc-
trines which necessarily go upon contrary Pro-
positions." Does it follow that *Cicero* here
made use of the TWO-FOLD Doctrine? If
he did, which was the popular, which the Secret
Doctrine? He used the word *Deus*, (which by
no means always signifies the same in *Latin* that
God does in *English*) He used the word, *Deus*,
figuratively, as he often has done for a *Person ve-
ry extraordinary*. Not by this teaching so much
as "Two different Doctrines;" much less using
an *Esoteric* and an *Exoteric* Doctrine; and less still
saying one thing and meaning another, but mean-
ing all along one and the same Doctrine, in ex-
pressing of which he has used a common ordina-
ry metaphorical Language. But

3. This Author is always to be put in mind,
that what occasioned Mr. *Warburton* to be called
upon to name an Instance of the *Philosophers say-
ing one thing and believing another*, was, that he
had

had confined the affair of the *Two-fold Doctrine*, to one and the same Doctrine differently handled, viz. *Popularly* and *Scientifically*. Now Tully's applying the Word, *Deus*, to the Mind of man, is nothing to the purpose, unless it can be shewn that He in *this* place is using the *Two fold Doctrine*: and 2dly, that where-ever a strong figurative Expression is made use of, there the Author is *saying* what he did *not mean*; or openly avowing what he did not really and truly believe. To keep to the Instance now before us; When Cicero calls *Plato*, *Deus ille noster*, or when he calls *Crassus*, *Deus*; designing to commend his extraordinary Eloquence. — Does he use the TWO-FOLD DOCTRINE, or does he mean more than We do, when we call a very good, benevolent, kind, friend, an *Angel*?

The next thing of moment is, “ We have seen
 “ the Philosophers of every Sect, one while speak-
 “ ing directly for, and another while as directly
 “ against a future State of Rewards and Pu-
 “ nishments, without intimating the least change
 “ in their Principles, or making the least hesita-
 “ tion in their Professions: So that either we
 “ must hold them guilty of the most gross and
 “ visible Contradictions, which their Characters
 “ will not suffer us to conceive of them, or else
 “ admit the Explanation given above of the
 “ *Double Doctrine* and the different Methods of
 “ the *Exoteric* and *Esoteric* Discipline.” p. 89.

It is confessed here by Mr. Warburton himself, (for these are Mr. Warburton's own words,) that if any one “ holds them guilty of gross contra-
 “ dictions,” then he need *not* “ admit the Ex-
 “ planation given of the Double Doctrine.” For either one or the other will solve the difficulty.
 Now

Now *Plutarch* has wrote a Treatise to shew the *Stoics* guilty of Contradictions; and He might have added many more instances to those which he has produced. This Author has produced Contradictions in several of the Old People: and no doubt if it were worth while to search, he might have produced Inconsistences and Contrarieties, in men of the best character among the most eminent Moderns: And happy is he who keeps clearest from such common failings. But why must we recur to a *Double Doctrine* to solve this Matter? *Cicero* e. g. in an Oration of his, said something about a future State which contradicted what his Sentiments are, as they lie expressed in other Books. Now the Notion of a *Double Doctrine* will not explain this. For surely upon this Scheme the denial of the Popular Notions of a future State must be an *Esoteric Doctrine*. How comes *Cicero* then in pleading for *Cluentius*, before the *Prætor*, to speak out *publicly*, what was the *Secret Doctrine*, which was so “flagitious and “destructive of Morality that they did not “dare to impart it to the People?” The whole manner of *Cicero*’s Pleadings, and the Right which he thought an Advocate had to speak any thing which he judged proper to serve his Client, or to sink his Adversary, will surely shew us how to account for this conduct in the Orator better than to recur to a *Two fold Doctrine*, of which no Trace appears; I mean of that Sort of Two-fold Doctrine, which is here contended for, a *Secret* and *Vulgar Doctrine*, by Virtue of which the Philosophers *actually said one thing and believed another*.

This Author next proceeds to an Instance which he judges will “add great Strength and Light

“ to

“ to the general Argument on this head.” It is that of *Synesius*: and I think it one of the most remarkable instances in all Antiquity. Such Honesty; Such Sincerity; Such a Love of Truth; Such an avowed Resolution not to act in Opposition to his Opinion; Such a fixt determination that his Mind and his Tongue should never differ; and all this from a principle that in acting thus he should *please God*,—that one cannot but be amazed that any one should make this man an instance of one, who thought that Philosophy “ allows the use of Lies and Fictions;” of one, who would “ think for himself at home, “ and in public preach up these very Fables” which were “ general and received.” But so it is: *Synesius* is produced; and it is added, As “ to “ his Philosophy he was a determined *Platonist*, “ however it might be *candied* over by a Bishop; And he adhered so closely to his System, that in consequence of it he gave up some “ of the most clear and evident Articles of “ the Christian Faith. He did indeed set “ the Authority of *Plato*, far above that of the “ inspired Penmen.” One may ask this Author, Whence all this *New Light* concerning *Synesius* has sprung? What *New Intelligence* has he got? He cites no body but *Synesius* himself; and that only in *One Letter*, wherein he professes openly his Opinions, and declares that he *never would speak* any thing *contrary to his Sentiments*. How then could this Author cite this Instance, or Mr. *Warburton* make himself *responsible* for so strange a representation? Let us see what *Photius* says of him, and whether he knew any thing of his “ *giving up* any Articles of the Christian Faith,” or of his “ setting the Authority of *Plato* far “ above

"above that of the Inspired Penmen." (a) Syneſius was a Gentile, applying himſelf to Philoſophy. They tell us that when he inclined to Chriſtianity, he admitted eaſily the other points, but as to the Reſurrection he would not admit it. Whether this Story be told of him elſewhere, I know not; but it is plainly found to be true from his Letter to Theophilus. But thus minded as he was, They initiated him into our Religion, and what is more they thought him worthy to be made a Biſhop, looking as well to the Purity of the Man's Life as to the exceeding Probity and Excellence of Him; and conceiving that a Man that lived in this manner, could not but be enlightened with the clear light of the Reſurrection; and they were not deceived in their Expectations. Evagrius (b) mentions him as having arrived at ſuch an high pitch of Philoſophy, that he was the Admiration of all Chriſtians that judge of things without favour or prejudice. Nicephorus gives him as great a character and calls him (c) a ſweet good tempered man; a man of many Virtues and Excellencies; a very eminent Phi-

(a) Οὗτος ἐξ Ἑλλήνων φιλοſοφία ſχολάζων ὃν φασι πρὸς τὸν θείας μὲν τῆς χριſτιανικῆς νουθεσίας, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παραδεχόμενος εὐπειθῶς, τὸν δὲ περὶ ἀναſταſεως (τὸ ἰδίον μὲν καὶ ἀλλοθεν, ἐκ δὲ ἰδίας, τῶς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς θεοφίλου ἀντιπαραβολῆς ἀποδείχεται καταλαμβάνεται) ἐκ ἐθέλειν προσιεῖν λόγον. Ἀλλ' ἐν καὶ ὅταν διακείμενος ἐμύνησαν τε τὰ ἡμέτερα, καὶ ἐτι καὶ ἀρχιερεὺς ἤγασαν: πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήν τῶ ἀνδρὶ καλοκαγαθίαν καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν ἀφορῶντες τῷ βίῳ καὶ ὅτι ἐκ ἂν ὅταν βίῳ ἀνθρώπου τὸ τῆς ἀναſταſεως ἐκ ἐλλαμφθείη φέγγος. Καὶ τῆς ἐλπίδος ἐψεύσθησαν. Photius Bibliot. c. 26.

(b) Φιλοſοφίαν δὲ ὅπως ἐς τὸ ἀκρίτατον ἐξήκνησεν, ὡς καὶ παρὰ χριſτιανῶν θαυμάσθηναι, τῶν μὴ προσπαθεῖα ἢ ἀντιπαθεία κινητῶν τα ὁράμενα. Evagr. Eccles. Hiſt. l. i. c. 15.

(c) Ἡμερὸν τὸν τρέπον καὶ μετρίον - πολλοῖς καὶ μεγάλῳ κομῶντα προτερήμασι. — ταῖς λοιπαῖς τὰνδρος ἀρεταῖς. — Οὗ κλέος ἀπάσαι τῇν ὑφίλιον διατρέχει. — ὅς ἦν, ὑπὲρ τῶν κατ' ἐκεῖνο καιρὸν λόγ. θ. ὅταν δὲ τῇ πλατωνικῇ προτεχάρησε φιλοſοφίᾳ καὶ εἰς τὸν ἀκρίτατον ὅρον ἦκεν αὐτῆς. Nicephor Eccles. Hiſt. l. 14. c. 55.

lofopher ; one whose Fame was spread all over the world ; one who had arrived at the very highest Top of the Platonic Philosophy. This is the character of him among the Antients : And now truly the Man is made to “ *set the Authority* “ of *Plato above the inspired Penmen*, and to give “ *up clear Articles of the Christian Faith.*” Here is no distinction of *Times* made ; when He did, and when He did not preach the Resurrection ; Before his Belief of it or After ; nor no account is made of his possibly being convinced of a Truth, which once he did not see.

But as the whole is founded upon a Letter of *Synefius's* own writing, it will be worth while to give it, in its plain and natural construction ; and then let the Reader judge of this Instance which was to give so much light to this argument.

After he had with great Modesty declared what his Notions were of the Duties incumbent on every one that took upon himself the Sacred Office, he tells his Brother, (for to his Brother he wrote this Letter and not to *Theophilus* as *Photius* has asserted) that “ He had dictated “ this Letter, that the matter might be quite “ *public and known to all* ; resolving that what- “ ever should happen he would *appear to God* “ and *Man*, and particularly to *Theophilus*, un- “ blameable.” Then he comes a little more to the point, having mentioned his being married, and his Resolution on no consideration to part with his Wife ; and goes on, “ *It is hard, if* “ *not impossible, to shake Opinions which are by* “ *the strongest Evidence fixed in any ones mind.* “ *You know that Philosophy is directly contrary to* “ *these much talked of Opinions. To instance : I* “ *will never maintain that the Soul is of la-* “ *ter Origin than the Body.* I will not say “ *that*

" that the world and its Parts will perish toge-
 " ther. I think the Resurrection so much preach-
 " ed up is something holy, and not to be spoken
 " of commonly, and I am far from going into the
 " Suppositions of the common People." Hitherto
 there is the greatest Openness and Honesty be-
 coming the Character which all the Antients
 agree to give him. After a Paragraph which I
 will presently set down, he says, " If I am
 " called to this sacred Office, I never will dis-
 " semble my Opinions. I call God and Man
 " to witness to this. Truth is proper to God,
 " to whom I am resolved to be in all things un-
 " blameable." — Soon after he says again, " I
 " will never hide my Opinions, nor shall my real
 " Opinion differ from my Tongue; acting thus
 " I cannot but think I shall please God. I will
 " not that any Notion of me should be left in any
 " one, as if I being unknown as to my Sentiments,
 " had surreptitiously stole Imposition of hands. But
 " let Theophilus determine about me, well know-
 " ing the whole: and as he knows so let him
 " signify it to me. For either he shall leave me
 " to continue in the Country philosophising by my-
 " self, or he shall not have it in his power after-
 " wards to condemn me, and to strike me out
 " of the list of the Bishops. Besides this I must
 " add, All other Opinion is a mere Trifle: For
 " Truth I well know is most dear to God."

After such full and hearty Declarations as these,
 is it not a matter of wonder that this man should
 be represented like a Knave; as if he were rea-
 dy to do any thing for a Bishoprick? As if he
 did in fact give up some of the most clear and
 evident Articles of Faith for the sake of prefer-
 ment. How is it possible to represent a man of
 this Disposition, as teaching the people what he

did *not* believe himself? Could he “ preach up
 “ the Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of
 “ the World, or the Doctrine of the Resurrecti-
 “ on, while he *believed them to be mere fables?* ”
 I would as soon believe that he preached up Blas-
 phemy and all sort of Immorality, as that he
taught what he did not believe, when he so feeling-
 ly speaks of the Obligation to follow *Truth*, and
 by that means only to make himself *acceptable to*
God.

It is indeed said by *Photius*, that after he was
 made a Bishop, the Doctrine of the Resurrection
 was *believed* by him, and the people that hoped
 it would be so, N. B. & ἐπεύδοσαν τῆς ἐλπίδος, *were*
not disappointed in their hopes. Now admitting
 that he did *preach up* the Doctrine of the *Resur-*
rection, (which no where I think is said) after he
 had made so strong a declaration against it,—This
 was consistent with his known *Honesty*. For it
 only shews that he refused to preach it when
 he was not convinced of its Truth, and after-
 wards when he was convinced, he did in fact
 preach it. Nor is this the one only instance that
 may be mentioned, where men as determined as
Synesius, have changed their Sentiments, and have
 honestly done what once they resolved never
 to do.

But is there nothing in this famous Letter that
 may seem to countenance this Author's heavy
 charge? I answer No. Nothing but his Mis-
 takes of the meaning of some of the Expressions
 used by the Good man. I will give you this
 Gentleman's Version, and then explain what *Syne-*
sius himself intended. When He had declared
 the Three Opinions he could not come into, as I
 before said. He goes on according to our Author
 thus. “ However *Philosophy when it has attained*
 “ *the*

“ *the Truth, allows the use of Lies and Fictions,*
 “ For Light answers to Truth, and the Eye to
 “ the People. The Eye would receive too great
 “ a quantity of Light to its own prejudice, and
 “ Hurt. As Darknefs is most proper and com-
 “ modious for those who have weak Eyes: *so I*
 “ *hold that Lies and Fictions are useful to the*
 “ *people, and that Truth would be hurtful to*
 “ Those who are not able to bear its light and
 “ splendour. If the Laws of the Church will
 “ dispense with this, I shall be ready to accept
 “ the Bishoprick; partly philosophising by myself
 “ at home, partly talking abroad in the common
 “ train, and preaching up the general received
 “ Fables.”

This is a very imperfect account of this part of
 Synesius's Letter; and even what is given is mis-
 represented. It should stand thus: “ *A Philo-*
 “ *sophic Mind, admitted to a perfect knowledge*
 “ *of Truth, sometimes yields to the use or ne-*
 “ *cessity of figment. For Light is analogous to*
 “ *Truth, and the Eye to the people. Just then as*
 “ *the Eye would receive hurt were it to have too*
 “ *much light, and as Darknefs is most proper for*
 “ *such as have weak Eyes, so I think art and co-*
 “ *vering or figment to be useful to the common*
 “ *people, and Truth hurtful to such as cannot look*
 “ *intently upon the clear Evidence of things. If*
 “ *the Laws of the Sacerdotal Office will allow these*
 “ *things to me I might then take the Holy Office*
 “ *upon me, at home philosophising; abroad speak-*
 “ *ing under the cover of Fable; if not teaching*
 “ *yet certainly not unteaching, what they have*
 “ *learnt, but suffering them to continue in their*
 “ *preconceived Notions. But if they say that a*
 “ *Priest should act and be in his Opinions just as*
 “ *the people are, I cannot for my part but disco-*
 “ *ver*

“ ver myself to all. For what have Philosophy
 “ and the common people to do with one another?
 “ The Truth of Divine things ought not to be di-
 “ vulged to all. The Commonalty is necessarily to be
 “ under other management. For I say it again
 “ and again, where there is no necessity, a Wise
 “ man would neither find fault nor be found fault
 “ with. But if I am called to the Priesthood, I
 “ will not dissemble my Opinions. Of this I
 “ call God and Man to witness,” &c.

A man of common sense, if he is perfectly
 convinced of any Truth, and if the Open decla-
 ration of it will do harm, or hurt to him that
 hears it, will either be silent, or cover it either
 by a *Fabulous Narration*, or by such *Disguise*, as
 may let those into it, who understand what is
 said, and yet conceal it from such as are unwor-
 thy of it. And this was the case of the *Para-
 bles* in Scripture, which covered the Truth from
 such whose prejudices made them incapable of
 seeing the Mysteries of the Kingdom of God,
 at the same time that they conveyed the full
 Truth to such as understood their design. *Synefi-
 us* resolved to indulge himself in the Search af-
 ter Truth: And as he thought that he had de-
 monstrative evidence for the points he declared
 himself convinced of, he resolved not to pretend
 to teach Notions which he did not believe: But
 as he could be silent upon them; or he could
 cover over Truth with some *Fabulous* Represen-
 tation, or in short, discourse so as he thought
 best and most profitable to his Hearers, so He
 resolved to do; but always with a Sacred re-
 gard to Truth. He never meant, nor did he
 ever think it lawful, “ to allow the use of Lies,”
 or to say one thing and mean another. This
 would be in flat contradiction to the words of his
 Letter,

Letter, where he says, *His Heart should never vary from his Tongue*, Οὐδὲ σεσιάσθαι μοι πρὸς τὴν γλῶττιν ἢ γάρμῃ. The whole therefore depends upon the meaning of two or three Words which he used, which if they are taken, as they are frequently used, make the Whole Letter and the known Character of *Synefius*, consistent.

The First of these words is ψεύδω, and ψεύδεται, which though in some cases they signify what implies an *immoral Act*, yet are they used often in a quite different manner. We have an instance just now cited concerning the case of *Synefius*: the people ἐκ ψεύδου τῆς ἐλπίδος, were not disappointed in their *Hopes*. So again when a Proposition is *false*, it is called ψεύδης, or the Verb ψεύδεται is used, where there is no thought of a *Lie*, or an *immoral fiction*. There are Eight or ten instances of this within the compass of a Page or two in *Ammonius Hermias's* Commentary upon *Aristotle's* Book, de Interpretatione. So too in *Plato* the *Writers of Fables* are said ψεύδουσθαι when they tell a *Fable*, without any regard to, or thought of the *immoral Act* of *Lying*. Hence the Verb comes to signify, to *deceive*, or *feign*, or to use any Art by which another may be kept from knowing any thing: and the Noun ψῦδος is used for such *Figment*, when just and lawful means are used to *conceal*, or *hide* ones *Designs*. So again, in the Other word here used, *Synefius* declared that he would at home philosophize, but abroad φιλομυθεῖν: he designed only to use the Liberty of dressing up his discourse in such *fabulous representation* as might be most profitable to his Hearers. He does not mean as this Author translates it, *Lies and Fictions*, but *Truths* told in *Fictions*, *Parables*, *fabulous Narrations*, such covers of Truth

as he judged best for his Auditors or Readers. We have a remarkable instance of this in his Book on *Providence*, which will sufficiently clear up what he meant by *Fable*. The Discourse is all a *μῦθος*, or *Fable*, concerning *Osiris* and *Typho*: and as *Osiris* is recommended as a wonderful good Man, he tells us that he was ἐν πρώτῃ παιδείᾳ καὶ φιλόμυθος, from his Infancy a Lover of *FABLE*. What? a Lover of *Lies* and *Fictions* in the immoral Sense of that word? No, just the contrary is true; for he speaks of *Truth*, as φιλοσόφημα τῶν παιδῶν, as the proper way of instructing children in *Truth*: And is the way to teach them *Truth*, to teach them *Lies*? That whole Treatise was a *μῦθος*, a *Fable* worked up for use, as he tells us in the Preface; and therefore it is a Shameful representation of *Synefius* to tell us that he contended for the Use of *Lies* and *Fictions* in public, whilst he was for philosophising at home, and it is in flat contradiction to the Design, and the exprefs declarations of his Letter.

Had this Author entered into the proper meaning of *Fictions* or *Fables*, and distinguished them as he ought, and as *Macrobius* has done like an honest, judicious, fair Writer, he would not have added to *Fictions* the term *Lies* which in *English* conveys the Idea of a base immoral Conduct. To cover over Truth by certain artificial ways of Speech, which may make it better received, or better retained, or make it enter into peoples minds better than by a direct and naked narration, is allowed by every body. The *Fables* or *Fictions* that *Plato* has frequently used, in order to convey Instruction in an agreeable manner are not *Lies*, but commendable pretty Dresses of the most important *Truths*. And when *Synefius* says,

says, that " a Philosophic Mind perfectly assured of Truth, yields to the Use or Necessity of *Fiction*," he never thought of LYING, or the USE OF LIES, but of such means of conveying *Truth* by *apt fiction*, as would be most useful to the people. When therefore this Author asks — " Was not this the case of *Syneſius*, to say what he did not believe?" I answer, No: no more than it is of every man that Uses *Parable*, or *Allegory*, or *Fable*, as *Æſop* or *Phædrus*, or any one that has dealt in *Hieroglyphics*. He adds, " He does not scruple to acknowledge that he did not believe the Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of the World, and the Doctrine of the Resurrection." True, But did he ever *preach* these Doctrines to the People? Or if he did preach one of *them*, (which this Author cannot prove) did he not THEN *believe* it? The man said honestly that he did *not believe* certain Doctrines which he openly declared against; and adds, that if they would put him into Orders, or make him a Bishop (which ever it was) Under these circumstances, He would submit, and do his Best. But he never once said that he would *teach* these doctrines either *publicly* or *privately*; nor as far as I can find, did he ever do so. So that this instance of *Syneſius*, does *not* " come up to the point in question," nor prove that He *said what he did not believe*.

I must beg leave to dwell on this affair a little longer. This Author has interpreted *φιλολογῶν*, *preaching up the general and received Fables* Now, 1. There is not a letter, or tittle, that intimates " *preaching up the general and received*" Fables implied in that word. Presently af-

E

terwards

terwards He says, that *Synefius* declared, " He " will think by himself at home, and in public " preach up these very *Fables*." I ask, What were those " general and received *Fables*, or " THOSE VERY *Fables* that he preached in public?" By the words immediately preceding, viz. " He " does not scruple to acknowledge that he did " not believe the Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of the World, and the Doctrine of " the Resurrection,"—By these words this Author would insinuate, that *Synefius* preached up the Scripture Doctrines on these points, which he did not believe, and that He called them, " the general and received *Fables*," and that he in public taught them. Now as this is all *Invention*, I must ask, Can this Author name any one of these Doctrines that *Synefius* ever preached, whilst he did not believe it? Is it right to traduce men in this shameless manner? Nay does not *Synefius* in this very Letter call God and man to witness, that he would not pretend to hold Opinions which he did not believe. This is such an Instance of Misrepresentation, as " Good manners will not suffer me to call by its right Name."

From *Synefius* let us pass to some other things. When this Author, or any one else, speaks of the Philosophers as holding, or not holding, a Future State of Rewards and Punishments, it is hardly justice to them to argue from *Consequences* which we do not know whether they admitted or not. The *Stoics* e. g. maintained an Absolute Fate in every thing; which I apprehend, must in direct consequence end in Atheism; nor can there be Rewards or Punishments for Actions done here, upon such a Scheme. But notwithstanding this Fatality, *Chrysippus* maintained that God punishes

nishes Vice, and does many things for the chastising the Wicked. Now if any one should argue from the Principle of *Fate*, that the *Stoics* who held that Principle, could not hold a Punishment of Vice, He would reason falsely against the *Stoics*, however truly in the nature of things. So too, Should another lay hold of this Principle, that *God punishes Vice*; and thence argue that the *Stoics* could not hold the Doctrine of *Fate*, because they held that *God does many things for the chastising the Wicked*, the reasoning would be just, in the nature of things; though false in point of fact in the *Stoics*. Nor is it a right way to argue from the charges made by *Adversaries*: for it is so much the Humour of men heated by Opposition, or blinded by Partiality, or Prejudice, to load one another with consequences, which they do not admit, that a man should be very tender how he reasons without having the full words of an Author himself, or how he takes from an Adversary a detached Sentence, without considering its Connexion, or Ground. This Writer (and Mr. Warburton has made himself responsible for him) has all along argued universally, as if I had denied that the Philosophers ever on any occasion, said one thing and thought another. Whereas it was expressly confined to the *Two-fold Doctrine*, and that *Two-fold Doctrine* as explained by Mr. Warburton, to be one and the same Doctrine, handled differently, viz. popularly and scientifically. And of this, He has not produced One Instance, nor do I think it in either of their Powers to produce one.

Again: Mr. Warburton has assured us that in the *Two-fold Doctrine*, " the EXTERNAL was openly taught to all, the Second or [INTERNAL]

“ was confined to a *Select Number*.” Surely it is a fair Objection, that we find *Both* these Doctrines equally *published* in the Writings of the Antients. What *Seneca*, or *Antoninus*, or *Aristotle*, or *Tully*, or any other has said, occurs in their *public Books*; and if they divulged *openly* what This Writer pretends to have been their *Secret Doctrine*, “ confined to a *select Number*,” there can be no difference betwixt their *open* and their *Secret Doctrine*. How did *Tully*, or *Antoninus*, or any one else, “ confine to a *Select few*,” what they Spoke in an *Open Audience*, or *published* for all the world to read? *Seneca* and *Aristotle* talked of *Death*, in a way which this Author *imagines*, (and it is no more than mere imagination) inconsistent “ with the Belief of any future Rewards or Punishments whatsoever.” Be it so. Was not this done in Books which were *known* and *read* by *Every Body*, or at least designed to be *published*? So then the same doctrine which was “ *confined to a Select Number*,” was *not confined to a Select Number*, but *published to Every body* that would buy or read: it was therefore an *Exo-Esoteric* Doctrine, an *open Secret* one, a riddle like the Old one of *Ælia Lælia Crispis*, that in short was *Every thing* and *Nothing*.

But this Author pretends to close with an Instance above all Exception. “ It is that of *Plato*—who spake sometimes for the popular Opinions of the Gods,—and yet at these very times disbelieved these Opinions, or this Divinity.” Here then is a plain instance, *that he said one thing and thought another*. p. 94.

Let us first suppose what will not be allowed, that *Plato* did in this point, *say one thing and think another*: Yet it will not come up to the

the point in debate, unless it first be proved, that This was done in consequence of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE: And this has never yet been proved. Now as an *Esoteric* and an *Exoteric* Doctrine has been shewn to consist in other matters, (and so was understood by the Antients) it is still to be *proved*, and not merely *asserted*, that because he said one thing and thought another in a particular point, that this was owing to *the Two-fold Doctrine*. But 2. suppose this difficulty got over; Mr. Warburton's Account of the *Two-fold Doctrine* which has occasioned this Trouble, must be still remembered: That "the *External* and *Internal*, "the *Vulgar* and *Secret*, Doctrine, — Were not "different Doctrines, but *one and the same* that "was handled thus differently, viz. *Popularly* "and *Scientifically*." Now it has sufficiently been shewn, that a man may teach in a *different* manner, and yet not make one a *Vulgar* and the other a *Secret* Doctrine, (as these words are made to signify not believing, or believing what is taught,) Since *Scientific* is not the same as *Secret* in Opposition to *Open*, nor does *Popular* imply the *saying one thing and believing another*.

I think it now sufficiently appears, that This Author has not produced *One Single Instance*, where the words *Esoteric* or *Exoteric* are made use of, or applied to Doctrines taught openly, but not believed; Or privately and in secret, because believed. Nor has he cited *one Author* on this occasion, whom he has not either misrepresented, or made some *inconsequent deduction* from. And if this be the Defence which Mr. Warburton is willing to stand or fall

fall by, " Let the Doctrine of the *Divine*
" Legation be deemed Chimerical and ground-
 less," or not, as the Evidence on this point
 now appears upon this debate.—Only let me
 add — That supposing this point of the Double
 Doctrine to be given up to him, yet his De-
 monstration of the *Divine Legation* must fail,
 since he has not proved that any of the
 Legislators of old, much less that All of
 them, made the Doctrine of a future State
 in its full extent, either the *Preface* or the
Sanction of their Laws, more than *Moses*
 has done.

May 4. 1747.



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